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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 930800-CA 
v. : Priority No. 2 
KIM BEDDOES, : 
Defendant/Appellant, : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (b) (ii) (Supp. 
1993) , in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Juab 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Guy R. Burningham, 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the case pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Does Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) (1990), Utah's 
entrapment statute, require adoption of a per se rule that 
entrapment is established as a matter of law solely because law 
enforcement furnished the contraband serving as the basis for 
charges against a defendant during a "controlled delivery" or 
"reverse sting" operation, irrespective of whether the defendant 
has established the elements of entrapment? 
This issue involves a question of statutory 
interpretation, which is purely a question of law. Accordingly, 
the trial court's implicit rejection of defendant's proposed 
interpretation of § 76-2-303(1) is reviewed for correctness. 
This Court need not afford any deference to the trial court's 
ruling on this issue. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994). 
2. Does the evidence presented at trial prove as a 
matter of law that defendant was entrapped into distributing 
cocaine? A reviewing court will affirm a conviction unless the 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, 
leaves no reasonable doubt that defendant was entrapped as a 
matter of law. State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1986). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) (1990)# Entrapment: 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement 
officer or a person directed by or acting in 
cooperation with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission for prosecution by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not other-
wise ready to commit it. Conduct merely 
affording a person an opportunity to commit 
an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with possession of 
a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (b) (ii) (Supp. 
1993) (R. 8). Prior to trial, defendant moved to have the charge 
dismissed based on a claim of entrapment (R. 22-31). After an 
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evidentiary hearing, the trial court took the issue under 
advisement and allowed the State to submit a memorandum in 
response to defendant's motion (R. 153). Shortly thereafter, the 
court entered a signed ruling in which it denied defendant's 
motion (R. 130-31). (A copy of the trial court's ruling is 
attached hereto as addendum A.) 
Defendant renewed his entrapment defense at his jury 
trial, but he was convicted as charged (R. 200). Defendant's 
conviction evidences the jury's rejection of his entrapment 
defense. 
On appeal, defendant challenges both the trial court's 
denial of his motion to dismiss based on entrapment as well as 
the jury's rejection of his entrapment defense. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On November 13, 1992, Ned Shepherd was arrested by 
Sergeant Paul Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol for possession 
of 15 pounds of marijuana. In a search incident to Shepherd's 
arrest, a list of names with corresponding phone numbers was 
found in Shepherd's wallet. The trooper transported Shepherd to 
the Juab County Jail and returned to his patrol duties (R. 3 06-
07, 406-07, 421). 
Juab County Deputy Sheriff William Thompkins and other 
officers, including two narcotics officers from Utah County, 
1
 Unless otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts from 
the record in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. 
State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989); see also State v. 
Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 501 (Utah 1989). 
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spoke with Shepherd. Specifically, the officers questioned 
Shepherd about the people on his list of names because they 
recognized several as people who police were investigating for 
suspected drug dealing in Juab and Utah counties. Among the 
names was "Kim", the phone number for which corresponded to 
defendant, Kim Beddoes. Thompkins had previously gathered 
"extensive intelligence information" on defendant because local 
authorities suspected defendant was distributing narcotics (R. 
342, 443). Thompkins was primarily interested in defendant 
because defendant was the only person on the list who lived in 
Juab County (R. 326). 
Shepherd readily acknowledged that the name "Kim" 
appearing on his list of names and numbers referred to defendant. 
Shepherd and defendant had been friends for over twenty years (R. 
425). More importantly, Shepherd told Thompkins that he had 
regularly sold drugs to defendant for many years. In recent 
transactions, Shepherd supplied defendant with approximately four 
ounces of marijuana. According to Shepherd, the purchase of four 
ounces of marijuana could be solely for personal use, but it 
typically indicated that the buyer was "probably purchasing it to 
probably use it and sell it to be able to make his money" (R. 
313). Also, although he had never personally seen defendant sell 
narcotics, Shepherd testified that in the past defendant 
indicated he sold controlled substances (R. 336, 407). 
In exchange for the State's reducing the possible 
felony charges against him to a class B misdemeanor and foregoing 
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any forfeiture action, Shepherd agreed to help local law 
enforcement "take down some drug dealers in [Juab County and] 
some drug dealers in Utah County" (R. 314). Specifically, 
Shepherd agreed to complete his planned deliveries to individuals 
in both counties (R. 328-29, 407-08, 447-48). According to 
Shepherd, even though he had no specific arrangement with 
defendant to deliver any marijuana to him on November 13, 1992, 
he was planning to deliver some of the 15 pounds of marijuana to 
defendant (R. 407, 418, 428, 547). That expectation was based 
on the fact that the last time he had spoken to defendant, 
defendant had requested marijuana. Shepherd told defendant he 
was going to get some more in about a month, but he never 
provided defendant a specific date of delivery (R. 407-08, 428-
29, 463-64) . However, Shepherd did not even tell his wife when 
he left for California to get the marijuana; he just did it (R. 
417) • 
After Shepherd agreed to complete his deliveries in 
return for leniency, Thompkins asked Shepherd how much marijuana 
would be an appropriate amount to deliver to defendant (R. 412). 
Shepherd replied, "a pound" (R. 321, 409, 426, 445). Shepherd 
also told Thompkins that his normal price for a pound of 
marijuana was $1,600 and that defendant owed him $450 from a 
prior transaction (R. 327, 411-413). 
Police then had Shepherd call defendant at his house. 
Shepherd tried to call defendant several times, but defendant 
apparently did not hear the phone ringing because he was outside 
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chopping wood (R. 329). Eventually, defendant answered the 
phone. Shepherd told defendant, "Kim, this is Shep. Stay home. 
I'll be there in a minute" (R. 315, 425). The cursory telephone 
conversation was not unusual for Shepherd and defendant. Indeed, 
Shepherd testified that he assumed defendant would then expect a 
delivery of drugs because when he "was going to deliver drugs, 
that's all [he] would say" (R. 329-30, 407-09). 
Shepherd was fitted with a "Fargo Unit" --a listening 
device that allowed the police to monitor and record the 
conversation between defendant and Shepherd at the time of the 
drug sale. Thompkins retrieved a package of marijuana from the 
department's evidence room and weighed it. Although it weighed 
23 ounces instead of the planned 16 ounces, the officers decided 
it would be better not to dismantle the 23 once package in order 
to break it down to a pound. The package was given to Shepherd, 
and he was instructed to take his car and complete the deliver to 
defendant. The officers monitored the transaction via the Fargo 
Unit (R. 410, 445-56, 544). 
Shepherd went to defendant's house at approximately 
5:07 p.m. Defendant met Shepherd outside, and Shepherd asked 
defendant if he had any money. Defendant said, "no," and the two 
entered the house together through a sliding door in the 
basement. Shepherd handed defendant the bag of marijuana and 
told that it was a pound. He also told defendant the pound would 
cost him $1,600 plus the $450 that he owed from their previous 
deal for a total of $2,050 (R. 545). Defendant never indicated 
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he did not want the marijuana or argue about the price (R. 413, 
548-49) . Defendant simply responded, "okay" (R. 331), and 
Shepherd turned around and left (R. 320, 410-13). 
When he was questioned about why he gave defendant the 
marijuana even though he did not receive any money for it from 
defendant, Shepherd explained that he "fronted" the marijuana to 
defendant as he had done in the past. "Fronting" is the practice 
of providing marijuana to a person without requiring them to pay 
for it upon delivery. It is a common practice in the illegal 
drug industry because the high cost of narcotics makes them 
difficult to purchase. "Fronting" enables dealers to have a 
supply for resale, and the understanding is that the proceeds 
from those transactions will be used to pay for the marijuana 
that was previously delivered as well as toward the next 
shipment. Although Shepherd acknowledged that it was extremely 
unusual for him to "front" marijuana to someone without first 
eliminating an existing debt, Shepherd frequently "fronted" 
marijuana to his customers (R. 327-28, 549-50). 
Shepherd was in defendant's house for about three 
minutes, and defendant did not question him about either the 
prior debt, the amount delivered, or the price. Shepherd did 
acknowledge that defendant may have been surprised by the amount 
of marijuana, but he testified that defendant did not otherwise 
seem surprised by the delivery (R. 320, 413, 548). 
The officers obtained and executed a search warrant for 
defendant's house. Even though the warrant was executed on a no 
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knock basis, by the time the officers got to defendant he was 
already in the bathroom and had attempted to flush the marijuana 
down the toilet. Thompkins, however, was able to retrieve the 
marijuana before defendant could to dispose of it. During a 
search of the house, the officers found baggies located near a 
scale. In the same area, they found a silver colored tray 
containing marijuana and a pipe. Several firearms also were 
seized (R. 4-5, 449-58). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly refused to adopt defendant's 
proposed per se rule of entrapment for cases in which law 
enforcement personal furnish the contraband used in a "reversed 
sting" operation. Defendant's proposed rule is inconsistent with 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) (1990), because under that provision 
a defendant asserting a defense of entrapment must demonstrate 
that the methods used by police created a substantial risk that 
person not otherwise ready to commit the offense commit by the 
defendant would have been induced to do so. Whether the 
furnishing of contraband creates such a risk, or merely provides 
a defendant with an opportunity to commit a crime, should be 
resolved on a case-by-case basis. Under the facts presented at 
the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss based on entrapment, 
the trial court properly determined that the issue should be 
submitted to the jury. Its denial of defendant's motion should 
therefore be affirmed. 
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Similarly, the evidence presented at defendant's trial, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict of 
guilty, does not prove as a matter of law that defendant was 
entrapped into purchasing marijuana from the police informant. 
The informant made no extreme pleas of desperate illness, appeals 
based on sympathy, pity, or close personal friendship, or offers 
of sex or inordinate sums of money in order to obtain narcotics 
from defendant. Although the informant and defendant had been 
friends for twenty years, there was no evidence that the 
informant traded on that friendship to induce defendant to 
purchase marijuana. Nor does the fact that the informant 
"fronted" the marijuana to defendant because defendant did not 
then have cash to pay for the contraband demonstrate that 
defendant was entrapped. Fronting is a common practice in the 
drug industry, and the informant had fronted narcotics to 
defendant in prior transactions. These issues were properly 
reserved for the jury's determination, and the jury's 
determination should be affirmed because it is not incorrect as a 
matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MERE FACT THAT POLICE FURNISHED 
CONTRABAND TO DEFENDANT VIA AN INFORMANT DOES 
NOT ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANT WAS ENTRAPPED 
UNDER EITHER UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303(1) 
(1990) OR UTAH CASE LAW 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
dismiss based on a defense of entrapment because defendant failed 
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to establish that, as a matter of law, the methods employed by 
law enforcement officials created a substantial risk that the 
offense would have been committed by a person not otherwise ready 
to commit it. The thrust of defendant's claim below was that 
whenever police provide the contraband that serve as the basis 
for a defendant's arrest entrapment is established as a matter of 
law. Likewise, defendant asks this Court adopt "the per se rule 
that, without more, police conduct of furnishing controlled 
substances to citizens in an attempt to ferret out criminals 
establishes entrapment as a matter of law." Br. of Appellant at 
14. 
This Court should reject defendant's proposed per se 
rule because it is contrary to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) 
(1990). Section 76-2-303(1) requires a showing that the police 
conduct created a substantial risk that persons not otherwise 
prepared to do so would have been induced to commit the offense 
committed by the defendant. Adoption of defendant's proposed per 
se rule would, in many cases such as this one, eliminate the 
statutorily required showing of improper inducement. 
Accordingly, the determination of whether entrapment is 
established during a "controlled delivery" or in "reverse sting" 
operations is best made on a case-by-case basis. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) (1990) defines entrapment, 
stating in pertinent part: 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement 
officer or a person directed by or acting in 
cooperation with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain 
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evidence of the commission for prosecution by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not other-
wise ready to commit it. Conduct merely 
affording a person an opportunity to commit 
an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
(Emphasis added). 
Despite the plain language of § 76-2-303(1) requiring 
him to demonstrate that the police methods created a substantial 
risk of inducement, defendant asks this Court to adopt a per se 
rule of entrapment that will relieve him of his burden of showing 
inducement. Although a few courts have adopted the per se rule 
advocated by defendant under an objective theory of entrapment, 
the majority and better reasoned position requires that the 
determination of whether a defendant was entrapped be made on a 
case-by-case basis. 
Even a cursory reading of the cases defendant relies 
upon for adoption of a per se rule of entrapment demonstrates 
that they are not driven by a concern that the method necessarily 
creates a substantial risk of inducement. Rather, they are 
predicated on the notion that the "[objective] entrapment defense 
is treated primarily as a curb upon improper law enforcement 
techniques." State v. Kummer, 481 N.W.2d 437, 443 (N.D. 1992) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also State 
v. Evans, 550 P.2d 830, 845 (Alaska 1976) ("In Alaska, it was 
expressly for the purpose of ensuring adequate supervision of law 
enforcement practices that we adopted the objective theory of 
entrapment."). 
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With the goal of supervising police conduct as their 
starting point, the jurisdictions that have adopted a per se rule 
of entrapment in reverse sting cases almost invariably engage in 
lengthy discussions about why, as a matter of public policy, it 
is inappropriate for police to supply narcotics under any 
circumstances. Kummer, upon which defendant relies heavily, is 
illustrative. 
In Kummer, the police officers supplied cocaine from 
the department's evidence room to an informant who then sold the 
cocaine to the defendant, a suspected drug dealer. After the 
sale was completed, the police arrested the defendant for 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. 
Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 438-38. 
Kummer raised an entrapment defense, which was rejected 
by the trial court. On appeal, he argued that he was entrapped 
as matter of law because the police "had to create and commit a 
crime" in order to arrest him. Kummer, 481 N.W. 2d at 441. The 
majority stated that defendants advancing an entrapment defense 
"must establish two elements: that law enforcement agents induced 
the commission of the crime and that the method of inducement was 
likely to cause normally law-abiding person to commit the 
offense." Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 441 (citation omitted). Its 
subsequent analysis, however, does not address the inducement 
requirement. 
Without ever explaining why the police provision of the 
narcotics is always "likely to cause normally law-abiding 
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person[s] to commit the offense [,]" the North Dakota Supreme 
Court went to great lengths to condemn the practice of reverse 
stings in narcotics cases. It concluded that the provision of 
narcotics by police was improper because the furnishing of 
contraband by police lacks the element of necessity that 
traditionally justifies police commission of crimes in undercover 
operations. Under Kummer, police can never make a controlled 
sale or delivery of narcotics to a suspected drug dealer. They 
must instead complete only controlled drug buys. Id. at 443. 
The court reasoned that, "like the exclusionary rule in search 
cases, [the per se entrapment rule] can be seen as a prophylactic 
rule intended to protect innocent persons from police action 
intended for the guilty. An agent who feels free to give drugs 
to targets creates a danger of corrupting the innocent that an 
agent who merely makes decoy purchases does not." Id. (citation 
omitted). 
The majority in Kummer also emphasized that when law 
enforcement officers possess and sell narcotics in reverse sting 
operations "there is a chance not only that the drugs will be 
used by the recipients, including novice users, but also that the 
drugs will be diverted to illegal channels." Id. (citation 
omitted). Accordingly, it adopted a per se rule of entrapment 
because it "eliminates any excuse for law enforcement officers or 
agents to possess controlled substances, except during that brief 
span between the seizure or undercover purchase and the placement 
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of the drugs in the police evidence locker, thereby facilitating 
enforcement of anticorruption measures. Id. (citation omitted). 
The Kummer majority unwisely resorted to an entrapment 
analysis to condemn what it viewed as distasteful police conduct 
without articulating why the use of reverse stings in narcotics 
cases always creates a substantial risk that a person not 
otherwise ready to commit the offense will be induced to commit a 
crime simply because police provide the contraband underlying the 
prosecution. As for the court's concerns about narcotics falling 
into the wrong hands and possible police corruption, neither 
issue has any bearing on the question of entrapment. More 
importantly, any "prophylactic" benefit from such a per se rule 
is equally well served by application of traditional objective 
entrapment standards on a case-by-case basis. Further, a case-
by- case approach avoids insulating those who were not in fact 
entrapped from prosecution, as appeared to be the case in Kummer. 
Indeed, Justice Vande Walle, who concurred only in the result 
reached in Kummer, emphasized that Kummer was not entrapped: 
I cannot fathom why a law enforcement officer 
who, undercover, offers to sell narcotics, 
induces the commission of an offense by 
persuasion or other means likely to cause 
normally law abiding persons to commit the 
offense anymore than if the defendant is 
offered narcotics by someone not a law 
enforcement officer. The defendant does not 
know that either seller is an undercover 
agent. To assume, as matter of law, that a 
defendant who is normally law abiding will 
purchase from a person who is an undercover 
agent but would not purchase from a seller 
who is not an undercover agent is 
disingenuous at best. 
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Kummer, 481 N.W.2d at 444-45 (Vande Walle, J., concurring 
specially). 
Justice Vande Walle also took issue with the rationale 
for adopting a per se rule of entrapment offered by other 
jurisdictions: 
Nevertheless, as noted by the majority 
opinion, a number of jurisdictions have 
adopted this tortured rationale. The logic 
of it escapes me, particularly in those 
jurisdictions which have adopted an 
"objective" standard for entrapment similar 
to that of North Dakota. The only 
explanation I can offer is that the courts, 
having determined that the actions of law 
enforcement officers were unacceptable as a 
matter of public policy, believed it 
necessary to cast their opinions in more 
traditional terms and, perhaps, more tenable 
forms such as entrapment. 
Id. 
Other courts addressing the issue of whether police 
provision of the narcotics underlying a defendant's prosecution 
have refused to adopt a per se rule of entrapment for reasons 
similar to those identified by Justice Vande Walle. For 
instance, the supreme courts of both Michigan and Hawaii have 
recently rejected the claim that entrapment per se is established 
when police execute reverse stings in narcotics cases. See 
People v. Jamieson. 461 N.W.2d 884 (Mich. 1990); State v. 
Agrabante, 830 P.2d 492 (Hawaii 1992). Their opinions are 
typical of those courts rejecting a proposed per se rule of 
entrapment under the objective standard. 
Hawaii, like Utah, applies the objective standard for 
entrapment. Agrabante, 492 P.2d at 499. Indeed, the pertinent 
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portion of Hawaii's entrapment statute is very similar to § 76-2-
303 (1) : 
(1) In any prosecution, it is an 
affirmative defense that the defendant was 
engaged in the prohibited conduct or caused 
the prohibited result because he was induced 
or encouraged to do so by a law enforcement 
officer, or a person acting in cooperation 
with a law enforcement officer, who, for the 
purpose of obtaining evidence of the 
commission of an offense, either: 
• • • 
(b) Employed methods of persuasion or 
inducement which created a substantial risk 
that the offense would be committed by-
persons other than those who are ready to 
commit it. 
Hawaii Revised Statute § 702-237 (1985) (emphasis added). 
Agrabante purchased cocaine from an undercover police 
officer in a reverse sting operation. The agreed price for the 
cocaine was $1,000, but Agrabante had only $690 with him. After 
some discussion, the undercover agent agreed that Agrabante could 
pay the balance the next day, collected the $690, and gave the 
cocaine to Agrabante. After the undercover agent gave a signal 
to nearby officers, the police arrested Agrabante. Agrabante, 
830 P.2d at 493. 
Agrabante was convicted, and on appeal he urged the 
Hawaii Supreme Court to hold that reverse stings constitute 
entrapment per se on the grounds that "the police themselves were 
the ones who provided and sold the cocaine, and but for those 
actions, . . . the offense for which [defendant] was convicted 
would not have occurred." Id. at 499 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The court not only refused to adopt a per se rule of 
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entrapment, but also affirmed the lower court's determination 
that Agrabante was not entrapped: 
In this case, there is no evidence that the 
reverse [sting] operation exhibited or 
displayed cocaine for sale to the general 
public or in any manner persuaded or induced 
persons other than those who were actively 
seeking to purchase such illegal drugs. Not 
only is the record devoid of any evidence 
that defendant was persuaded or induced by 
the police to purchase the cocaine, defendant 
did not have any contact with [the undercover 
agent] prior to . . . the date of the 
transaction. 
In this case, the police merely provided 
defendant an opportunity, as opposed to an 
inducement, to commit the charged offense. 
Agrabante, 830 P.2d at 500 (citations omitted). 
By the same token, the Michigan Supreme Court in 
Jamieson rejected an entrapment defense stemming from a reverse 
sting operation. In so doing, the court explained that the 
entrapment statute was not a catch-all provision to enable 
reviewing courts to supervise the police and emphasized that 
defendants had to show inducement in order to establish 
entrapment under the objective standard: 
[T]he defense of entrapment was not intended 
to be the remedy for any and all misconduct 
or neglect by police and their agents. The 
defense is only a remedy for conduct likely, 
when objectively considered, to induce or 
instigate the commission of the crime by a 
person not ready and willing to commit it. 
Jamieson, 461 N.W.2d at 892 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Jamieson court then held 
that the trial court's finding of entrapment under the objective 
standard was clearly erroneous because the police activity in 
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that case "served only to provide an opportunity for [the] 
defendants to engage in criminal activity." Id. at 897. 
Jamieson also serves as an excellent example of why a 
per se rule of entrapment sweeps too broadly. In that case, the 
defendants were all guards at a county jail. Authorities learned 
from an inmate that some of the guards were accepting money from 
inmates in return for smuggling contraband to them. Police had 
the informant ask the guards to pick up some drugs from his 
outside source, an uncover officer posing as a friend of the 
inmate. Several agreed to do so, and they each charged the 
informant a fee to smuggle the drugs into the jail. Once the 
authorities verified that the drugs given to the informant were 
the same ones that they had provided the guards, the guards were 
arrested. As the Jamieson court recognized, the defendants in 
that case "were not unwary or vulnerable. To the contrary, they 
were trained in law enforcement, sworn to uphold the law, and 
spent their working days in a most controlled environment in 
which they were in charge." Jamieson, 461 N.W.2d at 897. Nor 
were any of the traditional touchstones of entrapment, such as 
repeated requests for drugs or appeals based on friendship or 
sympathy, evidenced in the case. Id. at 893. 
Had the Jamieson court adopted a per se rule of 
entrapment, the guards would have been insulated from prosecution 
under facts that fell far short of satisfying the traditional 
objective entrapment standard. It is therefore difficult to see 
how the per se rule serves the public interest any better than 
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application of the objective standard on a case by case basis. On 
the contrary, the per se rule appears to hinder legitimate 
prosecutions without providing any tangible benefit. 
Like Jamieson. this case is a good example of why a per 
se rule of entrapment sweeps too broadly. It is clear that the 
police here did not create a crime by providing the marijuana 
that defendant purchased. Defendant had previously indicated to 
Shepherd that he wanted some marijuana, and Shepherd was planning 
to deliver a pound of marijuana to defendant. Fortuitously, 
police arrested Shepherd in Juab County before his deal with 
defendant had been consummated. Juab County officials took the 
opportunity to record the previously planned transaction in an 
effort to secure a conviction against a local drug dealer. 
Police did not initiate the transaction; they merely allowed it 
to be completed. What occurred in this case was not a reverse 
sting of the sort that Kummer found so problematic. Rather, it 
was what is commonly known as a "controlled delivery" that was 
already scheduled to be completed before the police became 
involved (R. 444). 
Like Hawaii and Michigan, Utah courts have never held 
that a defendant was entrapped merely because they found the 
government conduct distasteful. Those few jurisdictions that 
have adopted the per se rule of entrapment have failed to 
articulate how reverse stings necessarily result in inducement. 
Instead, they have taken issue with use of the practice in 
narcotics cases on public policy grounds. In so doing, those 
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courts have mistakenly permitted the separate and distinct 
defense of "outrageous government conduct" to masquerade as 
entrapment. Under State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517 (Utah App. 
1992), the trial court properly refused to be drawn into that 
quagmire. 
In Richardson, the defendant argued that he was 
entrapped into distributing narcotics as a matter of law because 
the conduct between the police and the informant who purchased 
the narcotics from the defendant was outrageous. In so doing, 
Richardson conceded that the conduct between himself and the 
informant did not constitute entrapment. Nevertheless, 
Richardson argued that "the government's conduct . . . was so 
outrageous that [his] conviction, resulting from that conduct, 
should not be allowed to stand." Richardson, 843 P.2d at 519. 
In rejecting Richardson's claim, this Court emphasized that: 
under Utah law, the propriety of [government 
action] is measured by its probable effect 
upon a hypothetical person in the setting in 
which the inducement took place. Under Utah 
law, therefore, the statutory entrapment 
defense is available only if there is 
impropriety by the government in its contacts 
with defendant, to the extent that an 
ordinary person in defendant's situation 
would be induced to commit a crime. 
Richardson, 843 P.2d at 520 (internal quotation marks, citations 
and footnote omitted) (emphasis added). In sum, Richardson 
sought an expansion of Utah's entrapment statute to include the 
defense of outrageous government conduct. Id. at 520 n.5. This 
Court held that "the expansion sought is inconsistent with both 
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rstate v. Tavlor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979)] and [Utah's 
entrapment] statute and, therefore, impermissible." Id. 
While the facts of this case are plainly 
distinguishable from those of Richardson, the legal principle at 
stake in both cases is constant: Under § 76-2-303(1) as 
interpreted in Taylor, a defendant must always demonstrate that 
the government's methods created as substantial risk that a 
person not otherwise ready to do so would have committed the 
offense committed by the defendant. Richardson. 843 P.2d at 519. 
In contrast, the defense of outrageous government 
conduct is "an alternative protection for criminal defendants 
where governmental conduct is at issue" that some jurisdictions 
have recognized under a due process theory. Richardson. 843 P.2d 
at 519 n.3. See also State v. Keitz. 856 P.2d 685, 687 n.l (Utah 
App. 1993) (rejecting defendant's claim that outrageous 
government conduct violated his due process rights under both 
state and federal constitutions). See generally Rivera v. State. 
846 P.2d 1, 4 (Wyo. 1993) (The court provides a detailed 
discussion of the outrageous government conduct defense as it 
relates to entrapment and explains that "[a]Ithough it bears some 
similarity to the objective theory of entrapment, this defense 
should not be confused with either of the traditional approaches 
to the entrapment defense."). But see United States v. Tucker. 
28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that defense known as 
outrageous governmental conduct, allegedly grounded in notions of 
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due process and fundamental fairness, does not exist and deciding 
to no longer entertain such claims). 
In this case, defendant has never presented a due 
process or outrageous governmental conduct defense. This Court 
should therefore, as it did in Richardson, refuse to consider 
such a claim. See Richardson. 843 P.2d at 519 n.4 (recognizing 
due process cases cited by defendant to support his outrageous 
governmental conduct claim of entrapment but refusing to address 
claim under due process clause because that argument was not 
presented to trial court or on appeal).2 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT DEPENDANT WAS ENTRAPPED INTO 
PURCHASING MARIJUANA 
The evidence presented at trial does not demonstrate 
that defendant was, as a matter of law, entrapped into committing 
the offense for which he was convicted. At trial, defendant 
relied solely on his entrapment defense, and the jury was 
2
 Defendant also claims that the trial court failed to enter 
findings of fact on the issue of entrapment before sending the 
issue to the jury and that a remand for the entry of findings is 
therefore necessary. That assertion is misplaced because no 
conflicting testimony was presented at the hearing on defendant's 
motion to dismiss based on entrapment. See State v. Ramirez. 817 
P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991) (reviewing court may infer findings 
where it would be reasonable to assume trial court made such 
findings). The trial court's order denying defendant's motion 
clearly states that it was denied because "[t]he conduct of the 
arresting officers comported with a fair and honorable 
administration of justice, and did not create a substantial risk 
that an average person would have been induced to commit the 
crime Defendant Kim Beddoes committed" (R. 130-31). That ruling, 
in light of the uncontested testimony at defendant's entrapment 
hearing, satisfies the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
303(4) (1990) . 
22 
properly instructed on it. Therefore, by convicting defendant, 
the jury necessarily found that defendant was not entrapped into 
committing the offense of possessing marijuana with intent to 
distribute. In this circumstance, asserting entrapment on appeal 
is considered a challenge to the jury verdict, even where a 
defendant argues that he was entrapped "as a matter of law." 
See, e.g., State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 499, 501 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Martin, 713 P.2d 60,61 (Utah 1986). 
In reviewing the jury's rejection of defendant's 
entrapment defense, this Court will review the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict. Moore, 782 P.2d at 501. Reversal is proper only if the 
Court determines that reasonable minds, acting fairly on the 
evidence, must have had a reasonable doubt that defendant was 
entrapped. State v. LeVasseur, 854 P.2d 1022, 1023 (Utah App. 
1993); State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 706 (Utah App. 1993). 
In Taylor, the Utah Supreme Court provided some 
guidance to determine whether or not entrapment has occurred: 
Extreme pleas of desperate illness or 
appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or 
close personal friendship, or offers of 
inordinate sums of money, are examples, 
depending on an evaluation of circumstances 
in each case, of what might constitute 
prohibited police conduct. 
Taylor, 599 P.2d at 503. 
Applying the Taylor test, Utah courts have found 
entrapment where an agent or confidential informant badgered or 
appealed to the pity or sympathy of a person. See State v. 
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Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465, 467-68 (Utah 1987) (agent sold herself as 
an attractive single mother on hard times); State v. Sprague, 
680 P.2d 404, 405 (Utah 1984) (agent prodded defendant whom he 
had no reason to believe was involved with drugs); State v. 
Kourbelas. 621 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Utah 1980) (repetitive request 
for drugs by agent); Taylor, 599 P.2d at 498-99, 503-04 
(defendant's former lover and close friend played on his sympathy 
and pity during her apparent withdrawal from heroin); State v. 
Soroushirn. 571 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Utah 1977) (agent badgered 
defendant). 
Conversely, Utah courts have consistently refused to 
overturn jury verdicts in the absence of "personalized high-
pressure tactics or appeals to extreme vulnerability." State v. 
Martin, 713 P.2d 60, 62 (Utah 1986) . See, e.g., State v. Moore, 
782 P.2d at 501 ("no pleas of desperation or appeals based 
primarily on sympathy or close personal friendship"); State v. 
Udell, 728 P.2d at 133 (defendant was known drug user, had 
previously sold drugs to agent, and refused only when he had none 
to sell); State v. Belt, 780 P.2d 1271, 1274 (Utah App. 1989) 
(agent "did not resort to pity, sympathy, or money"); State v. 
Wynia, 754 P.2d 667, 670 (Utah App. 1988) (no badgering, pleas, 
or high pressure tactics; " [a]11 the officers had to do was ask" 
for drugs), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988); State v. 
Wright. 744 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah App. 1987) (family relationship 
not exploited; "no pleas of desperation of appeals to friendship 
or loyalty"). 
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The Utah Supreme Court has even upheld the use of a 
reverse sting operation against a claim of entrapment in a case 
involving attempt to receive stolen property. State v. Sommers. 
569 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977). In Sommers. police were investigating 
the defendant because they suspected he was "fencing" stolen 
property. An undercover officer borrowed a color television from 
a local merchant and took it the defendant's place of business. 
He told defendant the television was stolen and offered to sell 
it to the defendant. The defendant agreed, and he paid the 
undercover officer $40.00. The Court easily rejected the 
defendant's claim that he was entrapped as a matter of law and 
held that the police merely afforded the defendant an opportunity 
to commit the crime. Id. at 1112. As this case demonstrates, 
there is no logical basis for distinguishing police provision of 
supposedly stolen property to suspected "fences" from police 
provision of narcotics to suspected drug dealers. The entrapment 
analysis in both settings must always focus on the question of 
improper inducement. 
It is undisputed that Shepherd and defendant had been 
friends for some twenty years. While defendant makes much of the 
fact, his argument ignores the key principle behind the defense 
of entrapment: the mere existence of a relationship, however 
close, does not establish entrapment. Shepherd never exploited 
the relationship between he and defendant in order to induce 
defendant to purchase the marijuana. There is no evidence that 
Shepherd conditioned the relationship on the defendant's purchase 
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of drugs or offered defendant the marijuana at an unreasonably 
low price under the guise of friendship. On the contrary, the 
evidence established that the price Shepherd quoted defendant for 
the pound of marijuana was in keeping with its market value. 
Shepherd engaged in no "[e]extreme pleas of desperate illness or 
appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close personal 
friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of money." Taylor, 599 
P.2d at 503. None were necessary. 
This case is akin to Moore. In that case, the 
defendant and the confidential informant had mutual friends, met 
at local bars, and the informant had been to defendant's home six 
or seven times and had spent one night there at a drug party. 
Moore 782 P.2d at 501. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the 
conviction for distribution of a controlled substance, stating: 
Regardless of defendant's view of their 
relationship, friendship alone does not 
constitute entrapment. Under the Taylor 
standard, there were no pleas of desperation 
or appeals based primarily on sympathy or 
close friendship, nor were there offers of 
inordinate sums of money. The conduct of the 
confidential informant was [a] proper use of 
governmental authority. 
Id. This Court has likewise echoed that sentiment. See, e.g., 
LeVasseur, 854 P.2d at 1025; Martinez, 848 P.2d at 707. 
The transaction that occurred between Shepherd and 
defendant was executed in the same way it would have been had 
Shepherd not been arrested by police before he completed his 
deliveries. The only difference was that police monitored the 
transaction via a Fargo Unit to ensure they would be able to 
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obtain a search warrant for defendant's house when the. 
transaction was finished. 
Defendant also contends Shepherd's decision to allow 
defendant to have the marijuana without first requiring him to 
pay for it is the equivalent of providing an inordinate sum of 
money under Tavlor. Br. of Appellant at 13. That claim is 
specious. The record demonstrates that defendant was not "given" 
the marijuana. On the contrary, he agreed to pay Shepherd $1,600 
for the purported pound of marijuana. The mere fact that 
Shepherd handed the marijuana to defendant even after defendant 
said he did not have money at the time of the delivery does not 
mean that Shepherd offered it to defendant free of charge as 
defendant implies. Instead, as defendant admits in his brief, 
Shepherd only "fronted" him the marijuana. Br. of App. at 11. 
As Shepherd testified, "fronting" is the practice of 
providing contraband to dealers without requiring them to pay for 
it at the time of delivery. Shepherd also testified that 
the practice is often necessary because of the high cost of 
illegal narcotics and indicated that he regularly fronts drugs to 
his customers. Shepherd's testimony about the practice of 
fronting is consistent with the experience of other courts. See, 
e.g.. State v. Rivera, 846 P.2d 1, 5 (Wyo. 1993) ("While the 
police did 'front' a portion of the purchase price, 'fronting' is 
quite prevalent in the illegal drug business, and that alone is 
not enough to show outrageous government conduct."). 
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Defendant correctly notes that he already owed Shepherd 
approximately $450 from a prior transaction in which Shepherd had 
fronted him a quantity of marijuana and that Shepherd testified 
his practice was not to front additional drugs to a customer 
until the prior debt was paid. The fact that Shepherd departed 
from his usual practice in this case, however, does not compel 
the conclusion that defendant was induced to agree to purchase 
the marijuana. The issue of what impact the fronting of the 
marijuana would have had on a person not otherwise prepared to 
commit the offense committed by defendant was properly reserved 
for the jury. Under the facts presented and in light of 
Shepherd's testimony about the practice of fronting, the jury 
could have reasonably concluded that defendant was not improperly 
induced into purchasing marijuana from Shepherd. Rather, they 
could have reasonably determined that defendant willingly 
incurred an additional debt of $1,600 in order to obtain the 
marijuana offered to him by Shepherd. 
Defendant also makes much of the fact that he was not 
expecting a delivery from Shepherd on the day in question. That 
assertion, though true, is potentially misleading in light of the 
record as a whole. Defendant clearly was expecting delivery of 
marijuana from Shepherd at some time. The evidence indicated 
that defendant told Shepherd he wanted marijuana when the two 
last met in person. Shepherd testified that he intended to 
deliver one pound of the 15 pounds of marijuana he had in his car 
to defendant and the remaining 14 pounds to a distributor in Utah 
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County. The fact that Shepherd was arrested before he was able 
to complete his deliveries presented Juab County law enforcement 
officers an excellent opportunity to go after a local drug 
dealer. Accordingly, defendant's deal with Shepherd was 
completed as planned while police monitored and recorded the 
transaction. The only reason why defendant did not know when 
Shepherd was going to make the delivery is because Shepherd did 
not know when he would be able to get the marijuana to sell to 
defendant. From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably 
decided that defendant asked Shepherd to supply him with 
marijuana as soon as Shepherd was able to do so and that the date 
of delivery was inconsequential. In any event, the evidence 
clearly showed that defendant unhesitatingly agreed to purchase 
the marijuana from Shepherd. 
In summary, none of the traditional touchstones of 
entrapment identified by the Court in Taylor are present in this 
case. Defendant had previously asked Shepherd to get some 
marijuana for him. When Shepherd offered to sell defendant a 
pound of marijuana at its market value, defendant accepted the 
offer without being subjected to any pressure or pleas. "Where 
there is a reasonable basis in evidence upon which jurors could 
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was a result of 
a defendant's own voluntary desire and intent to commit the 
crime, the fact that a police officer merely afforded him the 
opportunity to commit it, does not amount to entrapment." State 
v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah 1980). The State presented 
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ample evidence at trial upon which jurors could and did conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Shepherd's conduct at most 
afforded defendant an opportunity to commit the offense. This 
Court should therefore affirm the jury's determination that 
defendant was not entrapped. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the evidence presented at trial does not 
demonstrate that defendant was entrapped as a matter of law, and 
because the trial court properly refused to adopt defendant's 
proposed per se rule of entrapment, this Court should affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
Trial Court's Denial of 
idant ' s Motion to Dis 
Based on Entrapment 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KIM BHDDOES and ANNK1TE 
BEDDOES, ! 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. D-CR-920185 
RULING 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501 on Defendants' Motions to 
Dismiss and Motions to Suppress Evidence. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the 
memoranda of counsel, having entertained oral argument, and upon being advised in the 
premises, now makes the following: 
RULING 
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the charges against Defendant Annette Beddoes 
is granted. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the arresting officers had probable cause 
to sustain the charges of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. 
2. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on grounds of entrapment of Kim Beddoes is 
denied. The conduct of the arresting officers comported with a fair and honorable 
administration of justice, and did not create a substantial risk that an average person would 
have been induced to commit the crime Defendant Kim Beddoes committed. 
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3- Defendants* Motion to Suppress evidence of drug paraphernalia is denied. 
The officer who found the drug paraphernalia, Chief Bowles, was legally on the premises 
pursuant to a valid warrant authorizing the search for drugs and found the drug paraphernalia 
in plain view while searching for those drugs. 
4, Defendants' Motion to Suppress on grounds of illegally concealed recording 
device is denied. The informant upon whom the device was concealed consented to 
recording the conversation with Defendant Kim Beddoes. Since at least one party to the 
recorded conversation consented, no eavesdropping occurred and UCA §76-9-402(l)(a) does 
not apply. 
Dated this ^7day of May, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Donald J. Eyre, Jr. 
Shelden Carter 
Ruling Page -2-
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